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Checking the price tag on catastrophe:  
The social cost of carbon under non-linear climate response 
 
1. Introduction 
Uncertainty is arguably the defining characteristic of anthropogenic climate change for 
scientists and policy makers alike. Although the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and much climate change research focuses on “best guess” scenarios of gradual 
warming, or a limited range of economic and demographic futures such as those from the 
IPCC’s Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES), researchers acknowledge that the 
uncertainties involved are both massive and numerous (Oppenheimer et al., 2010, 
Weitzman, 2009, Allen and Ingram, 2002, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2007a). Beyond the range of possibilities considered by best guess or middle of the road 
analyses, within the feedbacks and thresholds poorly understood and thus ignored by most 
integrated assessment models, lies the potential for a variety of non-linear and high-damage 
climate responses to anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing. The events of the blockbuster 
film The Day After Tomorrow may be fantastic in nature, but it is not difficult to envision 
dramatic climate change triggered by human actions which will have profound impacts on 
the biosphere and human societies (Alley, et al., 2003, Higgins, et al., 2002, National 
Research Council, 2002, Overpeck and Webb, 2000, Schneider, 2003). The estimated 
probability functions of many relevant parameters and estimates of climate change welfare 
impacts themselves are strongly right-skewed, indicating that very large damages are 
possible (Weitzman, 2009, Fankhauser, 1995, Tol, 2005, Tol and De Vos, 1998). Weitzman 
(2009) makes a compelling argument that the fat right tail1 of the climate impact 
distribution, if properly taken into account, should dominate economic and policy analysis. 
 
Numerous studies have indicated that in the case of non-linear and very severe climate 
change impacts, optimal abatement increases substantially (Baranzini, et al., 2003, Gjerde, 
et al., 1998, Keller, et al., 2004, Kolstad, 1994, Mastrandrea, 2001, Tol, 2003, Yohe, 1996, 
Zickfield and Bruckner, 2003). The potential for non-linear and low-probability climate 
responses to anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing, however, has received little attention in 
the climate change damage cost literature to date (Alley, et al., 2003, Higgins, et al., 2002, 
Tol, 2009, Wright and Erikson, 2003). Low-probability climate responses and their effect on 
                                                                
1 Weitzman defines the “fat right tail” as a probability distribution function where the “tail probability 
approaches 0 more slowly than exponentially.”  (2009 at 2).  Weitzman notes that “the planetary welfare effect 
of climate changes that might accompany mean temperature increases from 10˚C up to 20˚C with probabilities 
anything remotely resembling 5% down to 1% implies a nonnegligible probability of worldwide catastrophe. . . . 
Standard approaches to modelling the economics of climate change (even those that purport to treat risk by 
Monte Carlo simulations) very likely fail to account adequately for the implications of large impacts with small 
probabilities. . . . For situations where there do not exist prior limits on damages (like climate change from 
greenhouse warming), CBA is likely to be dominated by considerations and concepts related more to catastrophe 
insurance than to the consumption smoothly consequences of long-term discounting—even at empirically 
plausible interest rates.”  Id. at 1-2. 
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estimates of the cost of climate change is the subject of the research presented here, which 
uses the integrated-assessment model FUND to explore projections of the social cost of 
carbon, or marginal social damage from a tonne of emitted carbon, in the context of three 
types of low-probability, high-impact climate response: Atlantic Ocean Meridional 
Overturning Circulation (MOC) collapse, large scale marine gas hydrate dissociation, and 
high climate sensitivity. 
 
An outline of our methodology follows in section 2, comprising a brief overview of FUND, 
and section 3 explains how the three sets of scenarios were selected, modeled and 
evaluated. Results are presented in section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.   
 
2. Methodology 
FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) is an 
integrated assessment model linking projections of populations, economic activity and 
emissions to a simple carbon cycle and climate model, and to a model predicting and 
monetizing welfare impacts caused by climate change. Climate change welfare impacts are 
monetized in dollars and are modeled over sixteen geographical regions.2 sea-levelThe 
source code, data, and a technical description of the model (version 3.6) can be found at 
http://www.fund-model.org. 
 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. 
The version used in this paper runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The primary 
reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In FUND, the 
welfare impacts of climate change are assumed to depend in part on the impacts during the 
previous year, reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial 
values cannot be approximated very well, both physical impacts and monetized welfare 
impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model 
runs. The 22nd and 23rd centuries are included to account for the fact that key impacts of a 
weakening or a shutdown of the Atlantic MOC as well as other catastrophic events would be 
disregarded if the time horizon of the simulations was shorter. 
 
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes & Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2010 is based on 
observations (and some extrapolation) (WRI, 2000). The climate scenarios for the period 
2010-2100 are based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in 
between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett, et al., 1992). The period 2100-2300 is extrapolated. 
                                                                
2 These are the United States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. 
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The scenarios are defined by varied rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements, and decarbonization of energy use 
(autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), as well as by emissions of carbon dioxide 
from land use change, methane emissions, and nitrous oxide emissions. The scenarios of 
economic and population growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic change. Population 
decreases are a result of changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. 
Heat and cold stress are assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive 
population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of births. Heat 
stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among the total 
population is based on the World Resources Databases (WRI, 2000). It is extrapolated based 
on the statistical relationship between urbanization and per-capita income, which are 
estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration between the 
regions of the world also causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are 
unrealistically assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective host 
population, as the focus here is not on “socially-contingent” impacts. 
 
The tangible welfare impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and 
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change 
reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the 
short-term. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy 
supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement 
policies, an option not considered in this paper as our focus is on the range of economic 
damages under business-as-usual emission scenarios. 
 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the effect of carbon dioxide 
emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the effect of the damages on 
the economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are 
taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by 
the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987).  Its parameters are taken from 
Hammitt et al. (1992).  
 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide aerosols is determined 
based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature, T, is governed by a geometric 
build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing, RF), with the e-folding time 
depending on the climate sensitivity. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in 
equilibrium by 3.0°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature is 
derived by multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to 
the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The 
global mean sea-level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the 
temperature and an e-folding time of 500 years. Both temperature and sea-level are 
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calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and sea-level for the IS92a scenario 
of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
 
The climate welfare impact module, based on Tol (2002a,b) includes the following 
categories: agriculture, forestry, sea-level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders 
related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy 
consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related 
damages are triggered by either the rate of temperature change (above 0.04°C/yr) or the 
level of temperature change (above 1.0°C).  Damages from the rate of temperature change 
slowly fade, reflecting adaptation. 
 
In the model individuals can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne 
diseasessea-level. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita 
income, which lies in the middle of the observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 
1992). The value of emigration, which is driven by sea-level rise, is set to be 3 times the per 
capita income (Tol, 1995, 1996); the gain from immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita 
income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea-level rise 
are modelled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was 
on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is 
assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 
million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The 
wetland value is assumed to have logistic relationship to per capita income. Coastal 
protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost 
due to the construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
 
Other welfare impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and 
ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of 
impacts measured in their ‘natural’ units. Modelled effects of climate change on energy 
consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize 
that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant 
physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on 
whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum 
climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the 
optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential 
impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of 
adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always 
negative. 
 
The welfare impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, 
water resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as 
simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change 
sign. Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
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technological progress.  Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as 
water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and 
ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to 
become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), 
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved 
health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
 
The marginal social damage from an additional tonne of emitted carbon—the social cost of 
carbon in $/tC—is computed by taking the difference in the net present value of the welfare 
impacts due to a small change in emissions over the decade 2010 – 2019, normalized by the 
change in emissions. These estimates can be done with all parameters set to their best 
guess, as well as in Monte Carlo mode.   
 
In the Monte Carlo analyses, essentially all parameters are varied. The probability density 
functions are mostly based on expert guesses, but where possible “objective” estimates 
were used. Parameters are assumed to vary independently of one another. Details of the 
Monte Carlo analysis can be found on FUND’s website at http://www.fund-model.org.  
 
Below, we define a number of extreme climate scenarios, and estimate the marginal social 
damage from a tonne of emitted carbon for these scenarios. This should be interpreted as 
an assessment of the sensitivity of damage estimates to departures from “best-guess” 
scenarios. Climate change welfare impact models are not validated. These models are 
calibrated to data and to other models, but as climate change is mostly in the future, 
validation is not possible. Assessing extreme climate scenarios, using FUND or any model, is 
inherently therefore largely an exercise in extrapolation. This is potentially problematic 
when the departure from business-as-usual is so great that the underlying assumptions 
about growth and relative prices become inapplicable, and the usual short cuts involved in 
cost-benefit analysis fail to apply (Dietz and Hepburn, 2011). One advantage of employing an 
integrated assessment model like FUND is that it enables full comparison of impacts and 
welfare analysis along different pathways. Nevertheless the reporting of a “marginal” social 
cost of carbon, as we do in this paper, must be treated with caution. Results should be 
viewed in this light:  rankings and orders of magnitudes are sound but precise estimates are 
not. 
 
3. Scenarios 
Seven scenarios were modeled in three sets. The first scenario extrapolates possible effects 
of a collapse of the Atlantic MOC. The second set of scenarios involves the dissociation of 
gas hydrates in the ocean, modeled by forcing FUND with a large annual release of methane, 
a potent greenhouse gas. We consider three annual release rates: 200MT (“M1”), 1784MT 
(“M2”) and 7800MT (“M3”). The third set of scenarios involves climate sensitivities higher 
than the “best guess” values traditionally used in social cost of carbon modeling—we 
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consider sensitivities of 4.5°C (“C1”), 7.7°C (“C2”) and 9.3°C (“C3”). Obviously, Atlantic MOC 
collapse and gas hydrate dissociation are specific non-linear responses, whereas high climate 
sensitivity is a more general low-probability climate response to greenhouse gas forcings. 
Given the structure of integrated assessment models and dearth of empirical projections of 
specific potential non-linear and low-probability climate responses, there are limited ways in 
which low-probability climate responses can be explored using these models. Both specific 
non-linear climate responses and overall climate sensitivity are sources of uncertainty in 
predicting climate change welfare impacts, and therefore both types of scenario provide 
useful context for considering “best guess” social cost of carbon estimates. The remainder of 
this section explains the scientific background for each of the scenarios and outlines how 
they were modeled and evaluated using FUND.   
3.1 Atlantic Ocean Meridional Overturning Circulation collapse 
The Atlantic Ocean Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC) describes the circulation of 
water in the oceans driven and maintained by thermal and saline (and thus density) 
differences. Prevailing winds in the tropics move warm surface waters in a predominant 
direction allowing deep water to upwell. As warm water travels north (travelling the furthest 
north in the North Atlantic), it cools and becomes denser, eventually sinking (deep water 
formation). The MOC today is thought to carry 1.2 (+/- .2) x 1015 W of heat north (Rahmstorf, 
1995), nearly half of the total equator-to-pole heat exchange (Wright and Erikson, 2003). 
The extent to which this moderates Europe’s climate relative to other regions at the same 
latitude such as Canada is debated, and some theorists argue that a reduction in ocean heat 
transport would be largely or wholly compensated by increased wind-driven heat and salt 
transports (National Research Council, 2002).  
 
Increases in atmospheric CO2 appear to have been associated with reductions in overturning 
circulation in the Northern Hemisphere in the past (Ahn and Brook, 2008). The majority of 
the models reported by the IPCC predict a weakening of the MOC under increased 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing during the 21st century (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007b, National Research Council, 2002). The warmer climate is predicted 
to intensify the hydrological cycle, increasing the net precipitation over evaporation in the 
North Atlantic region and thus “freshening” the North Atlantic waters. With this lower saline 
concentration, the sinking of water in higher latitudes will likely weaken (Clark, et al., 2003, 
Manabe and Stouffer, 2000, Marotzke, 2000). The melting and disintegration of icesheets 
such as the Greenland Ice Sheet or the Antarctic Ice Sheet due to warming temperatures 
would lead to an influx of freshwater into the oceans that could weaken or stop the MOC 
altogether (IPCC, 2007b). Such a collapse could be permanent on human timescales, even if 
anthropogenic climate change ended, and lead to cooling in the Northern Hemisphere and 
warming in the Southern Hemisphere.  
 
Changes in the ocean’s circulation have been associated with dramatic climate change in the 
past (Roberts et al., 2010, Blunier, et al., 1998, Broecker, 1997, Clark, et al., 2003, Thorpe, et 
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al., 2004), although the cause and effect dynamics within the climate system are debated 
(Broecker, 2003). The direct effect of a reduced MOC is simply a redistribution of energy. 
However, through effects on sea ice and clouds, the strength of trade winds, ventilation of 
the North Pacific, the strength of the Asian monsoon, or atmospheric carbon dioxide or 
water vapour, the effect of a MOC change could be amplified (Clark, et al., 2003, Ewen, et 
al., 2004, Hostetler, et al., 1999, Marotzke, 2000). Both models and palaeoclimatic data 
suggest that the MOC may have more than one stable “mode”, potentially involving 
alternative locations of deep water formation of varying stability and permitting rapid shifts 
from one mode to another as thresholds are reached (Broecker, 1997, Rahmstorf and 
Ganopolski, 1999, Stouffer and Manabe, 2003, Weaver, 1995), although this remains 
contentious. Greenland ice core records, for example, indicate that during the last glacial 
period, climate conditions over Greenland switched from intense cold to more moderate 
conditions over a period of years to decades (Broecker, 1997, Dansgaard, et al., 1993, 
Greenland Ice-core Project (GRIP) members, 1993).  
 
A cold spell often referred to as the Younger Dryas (YD) is considered the best-supported 
example of a change in ocean circulation serving as a trigger for large-scale cooling (Clark, et 
al., 2001).  Approximately 15,500 years ago, glacial conditions in the northern Atlantic 
rapidly came to an end, replaced by a climate similar to that of today (Broecker, 2000). After 
2,000 years the North Atlantic region’s climate suddenly reverted to near-glacial conditions, 
which lasted for approximately 1,200 years before warming abruptly resumed, marking the 
beginning of the Holocene. The YD was similar to the other dramatic oscillations of the 
glacial period whose dynamics are not well understood (Broecker, 2000, Broecker, 1994, 
Chondrogianni, et al., 2004). During the cold YD period, palaeo-data indicate that 
temperatures were very low over western Europe (Manabe and Stouffer, 2000). The YD 
period ended abruptly, potentially due to a second change in the ocean circulation (Manabe 
and Stouffer, 2000). A reduction in heat transport to northern latitudes due to changes in 
the ocean’s circulation is thought to be a possible trigger for the onset of ice ages as well as 
temporary cold spells such as the YD (Broecker, 2000, Marotzke, 2000). 
 
Greenland ice core records also indicate that after temperatures had reached or possibly 
surpassed modern conditions during the early Holocene, a brief and sudden cold event 
occurred approximately 8,000 years ago which has been connected to changes in the MOC, 
implying that changes in ocean circulation could have dramatic effects during interglacial as 
well as glacial times (Broecker, 1997). The event appears to have been approximately half of 
the amplitude of the YD, with a pattern of cold, dry, windy conditions in Greenland 
coincident with cold North Atlantic temperatures and strong North Atlantic trade winds 
which matches that of the YD as well as glacial stadial (cold) periods (Alley, et al., 1997). This 
pattern is consistent with model predictions of the effects of a decline in the North Atlantic 
oceanic heat transport. Palaeoclimatic records from other regions appear to show 
concurrent changes in climate (Alley, et al., 1997). 
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Current understanding of these dynamics is insufficient to produce confident predictions of 
the implications of a change in ocean circulation due to anthropogenic global warming. 
Models of MOC decline produce contrasting results ranging from, for example, a 30% 
amplification of global cooling due to sea ice growth and increased surface albedo 
(Ganopolski, et al., 1998) to no effect on global mean temperature (Marotzke, 2000) and 
various results in between (Clark, et al., 2003, Marotzke, 2000, Stocker, 2002). 
 
A number of modelling studies have shown that a change in ocean circulation due to 
warming could plausibly trigger an abrupt climate change event (Ewen, et al., 2004, Manabe 
and Stouffer, 1994, Rahmstorf, 1995, Stocker and Schmittner, 1997). Many models of a MOC 
collapse, however, show the effects to be mild and geographically limited to northern 
latitudes (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001b).  
 
Analysis of the impact of a MOC collapse on SCC estimates has been limited. Keller et al. 
(2004) and Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) use assumed welfare impacts, but Link and 
Tol (2004) model the total welfare impacts of a MOC collapse.  Both this paper and Link and 
Tol (2004) use a scenario of MOC collapse from the CLIMBER-2 model (Rahmstorf and 
Ganopolski, 1999). In this scenario, circulation breaks down completely by the early 23rd 
century and does not recover.  The North Atlantic region warms initially and then undergoes 
strong cooling as the MOC weakens and stops. Winter temperatures in the region peak in 
the early 22nd century and drop more than 4ºC by 2300. Link and Tol (2011) also model the 
total welfare impacts of a MOC collapse, using the scenario of Vellinga and Wood (2002) and 
focussing on the differential impacts between countries. The current paper, in contrast, 
estimates the impacts of an MOC collapse on the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
3.2 Marine methane hydrate destabilization 
Gas hydrates are formed when methane and water are present at low temperature and high 
pressure in ocean floor sediments and in permafrost (Glasby, 2003, Kvenvolden and 
Lorenson, 2001). Because temperature increases with depth beneath the ocean floor, 
marine hydrates are only stable in the upper few hundred or few thousand meters of 
continental margin sediments (depending upon the geothermal gradient), below which gas 
and water are stable (Glasby, 2003, Hornbach, et al., 2004). Estimates of the size of the 
marine gas hydrate stability zone (GHSZ) vary.  Recent estimates of the amount of methane 
hydrate in the ocean are in the range of 5.0 to 31.2 km3 and 100 to 74,400 Gt carbon (Fyke 
and Weaver, 2006). A free gas zone lies below the GHSZ, but the size of this area (and its 
potential involvement in methane release during gas hydrate destabilization) is poorly 
understood. According to one estimate (Hornbach, et al., 2004), the global free-gas reservoir 
could contain between 17% and 67% of the methane contained in hydrate.  
 
Methane hydrates near the GHSZ boundary are sensitive to changes in temperature and 
pressure (Glasby, 2003, Hornbach, et al., 2004). Observations of hydrates in the Gulf of 
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Mexico and other regions have documented gas releases in response to even small, 
transient temperature increases (Brewer, 2000). Destabilization of hydrates due to pressure 
or temperature changes or some other disturbance can produce landslides and trigger 
further destabilization through positive feedbacks potentially leading to large scale methane 
release (Bratton, 1999, Glasby, 2003). With gradual warming, destabilization can occur from 
the sediment-water interface downward (releasing methane into sea water immediately) as 
well as at the bottom of the stability zone progressing upward (leading to the accumulation 
of free gas poised for subsequent release beneath the stable hydrate) depending upon the 
spatial relationship between the GHSZ and the sediment-water interface (Harvey and Huang, 
1995).  The Storegga Slide in the Norwegian continental margin is thought to have been 
triggered by an earthquake, but the sediments must have been previously destabilized, 
potentially due to rising ocean temperatures. The landslide is thought to have released as 
much as 5 Gton C CH4 (Archer, 2007). Surveys of the ocean floor have discovered similar 
structures that indicate other large releases at the seafloor (Reagan and Moridis, 2007). 
 
Evidence suggests that methane from hydrates may have played a role in climate change, 
sometimes abrupt, in the past (MacDonald, 1990, National Research Council, 2002, Nisbet, 
2002, Pagani, 2006, Paull, et al., 1991, Reagan and Moridis, 2007), although this is not 
undisputed (Brook, et al., 2000, Xu and Lowell, 2001). Data from ice cores indicate that 
sudden increases in atmospheric CH4 have accompanied most of the interstadial warming 
events during the past 110,000 years, although the increases are insufficient to have caused 
the full observed warming (Broecker, 2000, Glasby, 2003, Kennett, et al., 2000) and 
atmospheric methane increases may have been an effect rather than a cause of climate 
change (Thorpe, et al., 1996). Kennett et al. (2000) contend that the stadial-interstadial 
bottom water temperature shifts of 2-3.5˚C were sufficient to form and destabilize marine 
gas hydrates over large regions of the north Pacific. 
 
The most widely discussed case is that of the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM, 
also known as the Latest Palaeocene Thermal Maximum). About 55 million years ago, the 
Earth underwent a period of global warming that lasted approximately 170,000 years 
(Pagani et al., 2006). At the beginning of this period, temperature reconstructions indicate 
that global temperatures increased by at least 5ºC in less than 10,000 years. Coincident with 
the rapid warming, a number of mammalian orders (including primates) appeared in the 
fossil record, deep-sea (benthic) species underwent a massive extinction, and the 13C/12C 
ratio in global carbon reservoirs dropped precipitously (Bralower, et al., 1997, Kaiho, et al., 
1996). It has been hypothesized that the warming resulted from a sudden change in ocean 
circulation which destabilized methane hydrates on continental slopes, releasing large 
amounts of methane into the atmosphere. Some of the released methane would have 
reacted with dissolved oxygen in the water and decreased dissolved oxygen availability, 
which may have caused the observed benthic extinctions. A substantial methane release 
from gas hydrates would provide an explanation for the massive addition of “light” 12C to the 
carbon cycle. The 13C/12C ratio remained constant for the first 10,000 years after the massive 
carbon input to the global carbon cycle (Dickens, 1999). This suggests balanced inputs and 
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outputs to the global carbon cycle, implying that the carbon cycle may take a considerable 
amount of time to recover from such a disturbance by removing “extra” carbon from the 
system.  
 
Future anthropogenic global warming could conceivably destabilize gas hydrates via 
increased bottom water temperatures due to a change in ocean circulation (involving 
inflows of warmer water to areas containing hydrates) or directly, by warming the ocean 
(Harvey and Huang, 1995; Reagan and Moridis, 2007, Reid et al., 2009). Although global 
temperature changes will take a long time to affect deep ocean marine hydrates because of 
the time needed for diffusion of heat into the sediment column, hydrates in shallow ocean 
sediments are much more sensitive to the warming projected for this century. A runaway 
greenhouse effect propelled by the dissociation of methane hydrates in permafrost and 
marine sediments is thought to be a possible but low-probability consequence of 
anthropogenic global warming (Harvey and Huang, 1995, Leggett, 1990, Nisbet, 1989, 
Reagan and Moridis, 2007). 
 
Some studies have questioned whether significant methane releases from hydrates would 
ever reach the atmosphere to trigger warming, as methane can be anaerobically oxidized by 
microbes in the surface sediment and aerobically oxidized by microbes in the water column 
(Brewer, 2000, Glasby, 2003, Kastner, 2001, Kvenvolden, 2002, Lamarque, 2007). Evidence 
from analyses of fossilized plant tissue and soil carbonate, however, indicates that the 
negative excursion (decrease) in the 13C/12C ratio observed in the marine carbonate record 
during the LPTM and the Aptian Stage of the Lower Cretaceous was also seen in atmospheric 
carbon, suggesting that methane from marine hydrates reached the atmosphere (Jahren, et 
al., 2001, Kvenvolden, 2002). In the event of a breach of the hydrate layer that allowed 
trapped free gas beneath to be released in a “blast of gas”, microbial oxidation capacity 
could be overwhelmed and substantial quantities of methane could reach the atmosphere 
(Dickens, et al., 1997, Kvenvolden, 2002, Kvenvolden, 1999). Even assuming normal release 
conditions, an oxidation lifetime of methane of 50 years (estimated for the high-latitude 
North Atlantic) is enough time to allow a significant fraction of the methane dissolving from 
bubbles to reach the atmosphere before it is oxidized (Archer 2007).  Further, a large 
destabilization of hydrates in sediment could release hydrates to float to the surface, where 
large quantities methane could be released to the atmosphere (Reid et al., 2009). 
Methane in the atmosphere reacts with hydroxyls (OH-), and therefore OH- availability alters 
the lifetime of atmospheric methane. Atmospheric OH- levels are increased by NOx and 
water vapor availability and decreased by hydrocarbon increases. The balance of these 
factors is likely to keep OH- availability and CH4 lifetime approximately unchanged from 
present values (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007b). However, depending 
upon emission rates, OH- concentration could change by -18% to 5% during the 21st Century 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007b). A catastrophic methane addition to 
the atmosphere could overwhelm the hydroxyl supply, thus significantly increasing the 
lifetime of atmospheric methane (Lashof, 1989). 
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There is some evidence that the process of methane destabilization due to warming has 
already begun. The Arctic region has warmed more rapidly than predicted in response to 
increased greenhouse gas concentrations, and the warming appears to be thawing both 
land-based hydrates in permafrost and marine hydrates. The East Siberian Arctic Seas (ESAS) 
are shallow seas covering flooded Siberian tundra (including the Laptev, East Siberian, and 
Russian part of the Chuckchi seas). The annual average temperature of the ESAS bottom 
seawater is 12º to 17ºC warmer than the annual average surface temperature over adjacent 
terrestrial permafrost, and therefore likely more vulnerable to thawing. Extensive summer 
seawater sampling in this region between 2003 and 2008 indicate that most of the ESAS 
near-bottom waters are supersaturated with methane, with over half of the ESAS surface 
waters also supersaturated (Shakhova et al., 2010). Winter sampling indicated even higher 
saturation levels. Because the average sea depth in the ESAS is 45 m, there is much less 
opportunity for the CH4 to be oxidized in the water column before it can reach the sea 
surface and be vented to the atmosphere. Overall flux to the atmosphere is estimated at 
7.98 Mt C-CH4, not including “catastrophic event” spikes due to sudden releases of larger 
quantities of methane from the seabed. This estimate is of the same magnitude as previous 
estimates of worldwide oceanic CH4 fluxes to the atmosphere, and indicates that sub-sea 
permafrost is no longer acting as a lid keep the shallow methane reservoir in place—opening 
the possibility of a more massive CH4 release period in the future. 
 
Three methane scenarios (M1, M2, M3) are modelled using FUND. The triggers for the 
marine hydrate destabilization envisioned here could be: 
1. a rapid decline of the meridional overturning circulation, which could change 
temperature and pressure in ocean sediment where hydrates are located (Fyke and 
Weaver, 2006, Rahmstorf, 1995, Rahmstorf and Ganopolski, 1999);   
2. high climate sensitivity and rapid warming affecting ocean temperatures; or 
3. loss of sea ice, decreased albedo, and increased absorption of radiation by the ocean 
surface in relatively shallow, high-latitude areas (Fyke and Weaver, 2006).  
 
These are hypothesized to lead to a significant (4-8˚C) temperature increase in intermediate 
and bottom waters in some locations and thus to hydrate destabilization and annual 
methane emissions to the atmosphere beginning in 2050 and continuing (through a runaway 
effect) for the duration of the model’s projection (through 2300). Because current 
understanding of the potential for the oxidation of methane in the water column and 
possible atmospheric hydroxyl shortages is limited, as discussed above, the potential for 
marine oxidation and increased atmospheric methane lifetime are not modelled. Of course, 
marine oxidation and extended atmospheric methane lifetime have significant potential to 
counteract each other. Further, the variation in flux rate between the scenarios would cover 
a substantial amount of variation in projections of marine methane quantity, the potential 
for significant oxidation, and changes in atmospheric methane lifetimes due to hydroxyl 
availability. If, however, both microbial oxidation and hydroxyl availability were 
overwhelmed and atmospheric methane quantity and lifetime both increased, the 
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projections here would likely be significant underestimates. In the low methane release 
scenario (M1), the flux is 200 Mt CH4/yr, the average of the low values of Kastner (2001), 
Dickens (1995, 1997), and Katz (1999). In the medium methane release scenario (M2), the 
flux is 1,784 Mt CH4/yr the average of Lamarque (2008) and the high flux projection from 
Harvey and Huang (1995). In the high methane release scenario (M3), the flux is 7,800 Mt 
CH4/yr, based on the high hydrate destabilization projection from Kastner (2001) (assuming 
10% loss from oxidation).  The quantity of methane that is released in these scenarios is also 
within the range of the hydrate carbon quantities in the Arctic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, peat, 
and permafrost that Archer (2007) projects as potentially disturbed within centuries of 
warming. 
 
We are not aware of any previous estimate of the total or marginal damage cost of methane 
hydrate destabilization. 
3.3 High climate sensitivity 
The climate sensitivity is as critical as it is uncertain; the cost and consequence of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions depends fundamentally upon the climate’s 
sensitivity and response to greenhouse gas forcings (Andronova and Schlesinger, 2001, 
Keller, et al., 2004). Palaeoclimatic records, models that try to mimic historical climate 
events and predict future climate change, and expert elicitation exercises all elicit ranges of 
climate sensitivity values (Royer et al., 2007, Kacholia and Peck, 1997). Climate sensitivity 
estimates range from inconsequential to severe; Andronova and Schlesinger (2001) report a 
90% confidence interval of 1-9˚C with a 15% chance that climate sensitivity exceeds 5.8˚C; 
Sanderson et al. (2008) show a 90% confidence interval of 2.45 to 7.75˚C across four 
different models; Stainforth et al. (2005) produced a range of 1.9 – 11.5˚C. The IPCC’s recent 
review of climate sensitivity estimates suggests that climate sensitivity is likely between 2 
and 4.5°C, with a best guess of approximately 3°C (IPCC, 2007a).  However, because 
uncertainties are large, probability distribution functions of climate sensitivity estimates 
tend to have long right tails, and neither these studies nor most experts rule out high values 
(Köhler et al., 2010, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007a, Roe and Baker, 
2007, Kacholia and Peck, 1997). Geophysical climate feedbacks such as water vapour, clouds, 
and sea ice are included in climate models but remain highly uncertain. Biogeochemical 
feedbacks such as the terrestrial carbon cycle are often omitted, as are more severe and 
low-probability feedbacks such as large-scale gas hydrate dissociation. Thus it seems clear 
that there is a low but real probability that climate sensitivity is very high, and a sizable 
probability that it is beyond the best guess range of 2 to 4.5°C.  It is also likely that climate 
sensitivity will remain uncertain even with advances in understanding of climate forcings and 
feedbacks (Roe and Baker, 2007). 
 
In order to investigate the effect of higher climate sensitivity on the projected social cost of 
carbon, the FUND model was run with three fixed climate sensitivities selected to represent 
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the range of estimates beyond the range commonly considered in social cost of carbon 
modelling: 
 Scenario C1 = 4.5˚C (the high end of the best guess IPCC range); 
 Scenario C2 = 7.7˚C (within the range predicted by Morgan and Keith’s experts 
(1995) as well those reported by Forest et al. (2002), Kacholia and Peck (1997), 
Sanderson et al. (2008), and Roe and Baker (2007)); and 
 Scenario C3 = 9.3˚C (based on the high end of the ranges found by Stainforth et al. 
(2005) and Andronova and Schlesinger (2001) and within the range reported by Roe 
and Baker (2007)). 
 
While studies that estimate the total or marginal impact of climate change routinely include 
a sensitivity analysis on the climate sensitivity, we are not aware of any study that considers 
as high a value as we do in this paper. 
 
4. Results 
The expected (mean) social cost of carbon resulting from each of the seven scenarios is 
presented in Table 1. All results are in 2010 USD for a marginal emission in the year 2010. 
Results are given for three different values for the pure rate of time preference (PRTP). The 
elasticity of marginal utility is assumed to be constant and equal to one, as is standard in 
many climate change economic analyses (Stern, 2007, Nordhaus, 2007; but see Dasgupta, 
2007, Gollier, 2006). The effective consumption discount rate used to compute the net 
present value of impacts is, of course, higher than the PRTP, because it also depends on the 
realized growth rates of per capita consumption in the Monte Carlo runs and the correlation 
of impacts with the stochastic discount factor that FUND computes.3 One other 
characteristic of note is that for PRTP=0%, the discounted marginal social damage from a 
tonne of emitted carbon is still significant at the end of the model’s run in 2299, indicating 
that the sum of the damages would increase with a longer time horizon. 
 
Table 1 presents probabilistic results: all parameters are varied in a Monte Carlo analysis. 
We also computed deterministic results; in these cases all parameters that are uncertain in 
the probabilistic analysis are set at their single best guess values (not presented). The 
deterministic results are in general much lower than the probabilistic social cost of carbon 
estimates that attempt to take into account many of the uncertainties surrounding climate 
change. In the case of the base scenario, for example, the probabilistic results are between 
1.3 and 1.7 times larger than their best guess counterparts.  
                                                                
3 The discounting follows the standard consumption based capital asset pricing model, see Cochrane (2005) for 
an introduction. 
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4.1 Atlantic Ocean Meridional Overturning Circulation collapse 
As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 4, the MOC scenario generates a slightly lower social 
cost of carbon than in the baseline scenario, but the difference is very small. This is due to 
the large rise in temperature in Western Europe (over 6˚C above pre-Industrial times by 
2150) that has occurred by the time the cooling in this scenario begins. The cooling offsets 
the warming, which is a benefit (Link and Tol, 2004).  
 
The difference between the probabilistic and deterministic results is largest for the MOC 
scenario. Probabilistic results are between 2.6 and 3.7 times larger than their best guess 
counterpart estimates. Monte Carlo runs generating higher damages involve significant costs 
in agriculture and cooling. Particularly, while the majority of runs see benefits to agriculture 
in early decades, such benefits are absent in the high damage runs. Because damages that 
occur in the 21st century are not discounted very heavily, runs with significant 21st century 
impacts tend to generate the highest SCC values.  
4.2 Marine methane hydrate destabilization 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the three methane scenarios act to amplify the marginal damage 
curves by increasing amounts with increasing methane quantities (although in M1 by a very 
small amount). Given the extremely low likelihood of widespread methane hydrate 
destabilization occurring as early as 2050, the social cost of carbon estimates themselves 
cannot be seen as robust. The rigorous result is that destabilization of methane hydrates 
could significantly amplify the social cost of carbon.  
 
The general pattern of damages is the same as that discussed in reference to the meridional 
overturning circulation collapse scenarios above, with damages in the agriculture and 
cooling sectors dominating. As the results in Table 1 suggest, there are no obvious dynamics 
between these scenarios and the different discounting schemes. The damages are increased 
by a factor of 1.3 under M2 for all discounting schemes, and by a factor of 1.7-1.9 for M3. 
Mean atmospheric methane concentrations for all three scenarios are shown in Figure 6. 
4.3 High climate sensitivity 
The results for the climate sensitivity scenarios are the most interesting, with both a strong 
influence on the marginal social damages from a tonne of emitted carbon (in all three 
scenarios) and a powerful dynamic with discounting methods. Depending upon the 
discounting scheme chosen, the social cost of carbon under the high climate sensitivity 
scenario (C3) is 2.4 or 3.4 times greater than the base case (see Table 1). Projected marginal 
social damage from a tonne of emitted carbon with the low climate sensitivity scenario using 
PRTP=3% increases from 8 in the base case to 12 $/tC and from 553 to 831 $/tC under 
PRTP=0%. With PRTP=0%, discounted damages continue to rise through 2300, driven by 
damages to agriculture and by welfare impacts in China. Extending the model’s time horizon 
with these scenarios seems likely to augment the social cost of carbon considerably. Welfare 
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impacts in western Europe comprise a significant contribution to total damages early on 
(driven by impacts to the cooling and agriculture sectors), with the former Soviet Union and 
North Africa becoming somewhat significant later in the projection due to rising mortality. 
The rapid rise in agricultural damages is driven both by increasing distance from a climate 
optimum and the demands of rapid adaptation. Under the other discounting schemes, the 
damage patterns follow that of the base case, with damages amplified with earlier and 
higher peaks as is logical in the projected context of faster and greater warming.  
 
The probability density function generated from 10,000 Monte Carlo runs using the three 
climate sensitivity scenarios is shown in Figure 2. The very high and low runs are, as above, 
dominated by agriculture and cooling sector damages (particularly in China), with some 
contribution from human health, water and species loss. The impact of the climate 
sensitivity scenarios on the expected (mean) social cost of carbon estimates using a 1% PRTP 
is shown in Figure 3. 
 
5. Discussion 
Although it may never be possible to quantify the probability of anthropogenic climate 
change triggering non-linear and catastrophic climate responses, there is general agreement 
that the probability of such responses increases with the rate and quantity of greenhouse 
gas emissions (Alley, et al., 2003, Broecker, 1997, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2001a, National Research Council, 2002, Schneider and Azar, 2001). Potential 
damages under the scenarios discussed here range as high as $19/tC for a PRTP of 3%, as 
high as $290/tC with a PRTP of 1% and as high as $1,879/tC with a 0% PRTP. Even if the 
probability of such events coming to pass is small, these projections provide useful context 
for the “best guess” estimates of marginal social damage from a tonne of emitted carbon. 
An analysis of social cost of carbon estimates by Tol (2009) generated an average social cost 
of carbon of $26/tC (3% PRTP); $123/tC (1% PRTP); and $335/tC (0% PRTP); modal 
estimates, however, were in the range of $19/tC.4  
 
Moreover, it is possible that the range of damages found here underestimates the actual 
range, as  
much of the climate change welfare impacts research, including this study, omits many 
welfare impacts and likely undervalues others (Tol, 2002a, Tol, 2002b,). The models also 
ignore interactions between sectors (e.g., between agriculture and water) and changes in 
weather variability and extremes, except to the limited degree these are included in the 
underlying literature. It should be noted that this paper is merely a first effort at modeling 
potential non-linear and low-probability climate responses to greenhouse gas emissions. We 
have not considered possible interactions between the scenarios we modeled. We have not 
                                                                
4 Converted to $2010 using the consumer price index. 
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incorporated the potential for social amplification of physical impacts, such as conflict due to 
climate-related migration, drought, or food shortages. Furthermore, three important 
potential non-linear climate responses—West-Antarctic ice sheet destabilization, ecosystem 
service degradation, and intense hydrologic variation—are not explored here because the 
relevant impact predictions are not sufficiently quantitative or because the impact models 
are not yet able to adequately handle these scenarios. It seems likely that damages due to 
such climate responses would be very large. Thus estimates of potential impacts—including 
the estimates of costs presented here—may well be underestimates of anthropogenic 
climate change damages.  
 
The uncertainties involved in (possibly irreversibly) forcing the climate into a new, totally 
unknown regime may be seen, in and of themselves, as a compelling reason to abate 
anthropogenic climate change (Tol, 2002b). Given the limitations in our ability to model the 
future climate and climate change damages, in addition to the potential for non-linear and 
low-probability catastrophic climate responses with large damages, it is inappropriate to rely 
on “best guess” climate scenarios to dictate optimal mitigation investment pathways in a 
policy context. As with other policy areas involving low-probability but high damage 
potential impacts—terrorism, nuclear proliferation, oil spills, and flood prevention come to 
mind—worst case scenarios must be considered when crafting policy. 
 
Economic modelling studies clearly indicate that although aggressive climate change 
mitigation investments are inefficient today when analyzing “best guess” climate change 
projections using conventional discount rates5 (Maddison, 2001, Mendelsohn, 2001), the 
possibility of non-linear climate responses which involve large damages supports much 
larger public investment in mitigation (Keller, et al., 2004, Kolstad, 1994, Tol, 2003). The 
work presented here shows, for the first time, that non-linear and low-probability climate 
responses currently discussed in the scientific literature would likely have significant effects 
on projections of marginal social damage from a tonne of emitted carbon as calculated in 
integrated assessment models such as FUND. These results reinforce the validity of earlier 
work showing that “catastrophic” outcomes can justify aggressive near-term abatement 
within a cost-benefit framework.  
 
Yet even if it is apparent that non-linear and low-probability climate responses ought to be 
taken into account, the critical question of what value of marginal social damage from a 
tonne of emitted carbon to use in policy-making remains. Specifying a consensus value (or 
range of values) is important because otherwise a default value of zero is employed, or a 
range of different values inconsistently applied. Although some have urged the IPCC to 
                                                                
5 Choices about discount rates are critical to the marginal damage computations, and these are partly 
ethical decisions about how to treat future generations that can only be made by policy-makers. 
Further, although not discussed in reference to the scenarios presented here, with equity weighting 
the projected damages of climate change increase significantly, including in explorations of severe 
climate change damages (Tol 2003).  
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assign probabilities to various possible climate futures (Giles, 2002), doing so is both highly 
subjective and likely inappropriate given that practitioners have fundamental (and 
scientifically valid) disagreements about the future of the climate system, many value 
judgments are implicit in the valuation of costs and benefits, and the cumulative 
uncertainties are massive (Lempert and Schlesinger, 2001, Schneider and Azar, 2001). The 
appropriate response, instead, is the development of policies that will be robust to a range 
of potential physical and welfare impact scenarios. Specifically, this means finding the most 
efficient way of keeping open the possibility of stabilizing greenhouse gases at a low 
atmospheric concentration (not much higher than that of today) in the event that high 
damage scenarios are not ruled out as the field of study advances. Because of the inertia in 
capital stocks, R&D investment, and political systems, preserving this option may imply using 
a relatively high value for the social cost of carbon in current policy analysis. 
 
Of course, not all of the scenarios discussed above had a significant influence on marginal 
social damage projections. The projections of a slight lowering of damages with the MOC 
shut-down scenario are interesting in their own right for several reasons. First, it seems 
likely that the hydrologic variability and ecosystem impacts induced by the MOC changes 
projected in this scenario would produce damages not seen here. It is unlikely that these are 
large (in terms of human welfare), as they would primarily occur over the ocean. Fisheries 
could be affected, although this is small part of the economy and increasingly managed. 
FUND may also overstate adaptive capacity. In addition, if a MOC shut-down led to a 
decreased uptake of CO2 in the ocean, climate change and its impacts would be worse. 
Second, in terms of changes in utility as measured by models such as FUND, welfare impacts 
associated with a MOC collapse seem unlikely to be significant—and thus perhaps the strong 
focus on this particular non-linear climate response within the catastrophic climate change 
welfare impact literature is unwarranted. Third, an Atlantic MOC shut-down is a negative 
regional feedback in a warming world, and thus projections of a beneficial welfare impact in 
Western Europe should not be surprising.     
 
6. Conclusions 
Uncertainty is fundamental to the study and policy of climate change. Enormous 
uncertainties in predicting the climate system’s response to rising atmospheric greenhouse 
gas concentrations are compounded by the difficulty of predicting how a changing climate 
will affect highly complex social and economic systems. Nevertheless, most economic 
research on climate change welfare impacts has focused on “best guess” scenarios in which 
the climate warms gradually and relatively benevolently. Using such scenarios, most 
estimates of the social cost of carbon are under $72/tC. The implication is that although 
emission cuts are warranted, most reductions should be delayed while technologies are 
further developed.  
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The limitation with employing “best guess” modelling is that it disregards the importance 
and the nature of the uncertainties involved. The estimated probability distribution 
functions of many relevant parameters and estimates of climate change welfare impacts 
themselves are strongly right-skewed, indicating the potential for very large damages. Part 
of this skew is due to the nature of the climate system, which contains multiple feedbacks 
and thresholds that allow the possibility of non-linear and low-probability responses to 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcings. Our attempt to include selected extreme climate 
scenarios found estimates of marginal social damages from a tonne of emitted carbon as 
high as $1,879/tC with a 0% pure rate of time preference. Many “catastrophic” scenarios of 
non-linear and low-probabilty climate responses cannot yet be modelled, either because our 
understanding of the non-linear systems is too limited or because the impact models are 
unable to run such scenarios. 
 
The physical impacts of climate change on the Earth will be long-term and potentially 
irreversible on the timescale of human societies. Yet as models extend both the climate and 
the economy into the future, uncertainty levels grow rapidly. Furthermore, interactions 
between damage sectors (such as agricultural damages leading to emigration), potential 
social amplification of impacts (such as a series of droughts leading to political instability), 
and the degradation of ecosystem services are generally not included in integrated 
assessment models.  
 
Thus the marginal social damage estimates found in the welfare impacts literature may well 
be underestimates. Even more importantly, they do not reflect the real possibility of 
catastrophic and highly expensive outcomes—outcomes which are low-probability but not 
zero probability. This research suggests that it is inappropriate for governments to ignore  
the possibility of highly negative and likely irreversible outcomes in cost benefit analysis. The 
question is how best to do so, when the uncertainties are so great that it is impossible to 
determine precise thresholds of non-linear economic or climate response. The longer 
emissions cuts are postponed and the longer the world’s economies (and research agendas) 
develop without strong signals to reduce emissions, the more difficult and costly it will likely 
become to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at lower levels. Where 
catastrophic outcomes remain a real possibility, the primary goal of policy should be to find 
the optimal, efficient path that realistically preserves the option of meeting a low 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration ceiling, while allowing the possibility that this 
pathway may be relaxed or tightened as uncertainties are lessened. The second goal should 
be to reduce the uncertainties involved in both best guess and non-linear climate and 
welfare impact predictions.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: The mean social cost of carbon (2010$/tC) under different scenarios. “MC” columns present 
Monte Carlo results; “BG” columns present Best Guess. 
 
Scenario PRTP=0% PRTP=1% PRTP=3% 
 MC BG MC BG MC BG 
Base case 553 359 108 85 8 5 
MOC collapse 536 341 105 81 8 4 
M1: +200MT p.a. CH4 578 367 112 87 8 5 
M2: +1784MT p.a. CH4 711 423 135 99 11 6 
M3: +7800MT p.a. CH4 1021 583 187 131 15 10 
C1: Climate sensitivity 4.5˚C 831 722 155 145 12 9 
C2: Climate sensitivity 7.7˚C 1608 1426 258 236 18 14 
C3: Climate sensitivity 9.3˚C 1879 1670 290 265 19 15 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Impact of methane scenarios on marginal social damage calculations using a 1% pure rate of 
time preference 
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Figure 2: Frequency distributions (10,000 runs) for climate sensitivity scenarios using a pure rate of 
time preference of 1% 
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Figure 3: Impact of climate sensitivity scenarios on marginal social damage calculations using a 1% 
pure rate of time preference 
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Figure 4: Impact of MOC scenario on marginal social damage calculations using a 1% pure rate of time 
preference 
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Figure 5: Mean temperature projections for all scenarios 
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Figure 6: Mean atmospheric CH4 concentration for all methane scenarios 
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